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HOW TO AVOID THE CONSTRAINTS OF RULE 10b-5(b): A
FIRST CIRCUIT GUIDE FOR UNDERWRITERS
Eric H. Franklin1
If an underwriter knows that a prospectus contains a material
misrepresentation, may that underwriter use the prospectus to sell
securities, or would that expose the underwriter to liability under Rule
10b-5(b)? The First Circuit’s surprising and rather disconcerting
answer was delivered on March 10, 2010 in Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Tambone. In Tambone, the First Circuit held that the
SEC could not hold underwriters liable for such misrepresentations if
they did not draft the prospectus. Ostensibly, this holding is nothing
more than a judicial check on the SEC’s enforcement powers under Rule
10b-5(b). However, the practical result of this holding is disturbing. This
decision not only provides a perverse incentive for prospectus drafters to
be as ignorant as possible, but it also teaches unscrupulous underwriters
how to use material misstatements without running afoul of Rule 10b5(b). The decision sharply constrains the enforcement powers of the SEC
and is in direct conflict with both the intent of Rule 10b-5(b) and the
current desire to increase regulatory scrutiny of financial markets.
Regardless of the outcome, Supreme Court review of this decision is
vital. A reversal would represent a victory for investors and a blow to
dishonest securities sales techniques, and an affirmation might inspire
Congress to reinstate the SEC with the enforcement powers necessary to
protect investors.
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I.

INTRODUCTION: AN UNDERWRITER‟S DILEMMA

Imagine an underwriter. Given the poor economy that currently
plagues our markets, it should not be a great exercise to imagine that our
underwriter has found his job difficult of late.2 But perhaps this difficulty
is unwarranted. After all, our underwriter does not make his livelihood
trading in subprime mortgage-backed securities,3 and he does not work
for an investment bank that lavishes its employees with outrageous
bonuses.4 Rather, our underwriter has made his salary selling mutual
funds, a product that is neither the blame of the financial crisis 5 nor a
provider of year-end riches. Regardless, business is not good. Investors,
justifiably wary of exotic securities, have turned a critical eye to more
familiar investment vehicles, and our underwriter‟s product is not
immune.6
Mutual funds, long the favored investment of the prudent,7 have
been scrutinized by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) due
2

However undeserved, the author assumes a modicum of posterity by reminding future
readers of the financial crisis of the late aughts, caused in part by the trading of
mortgage-backed securities.
3
“Mortgage-backed securities” have been defined, rather dryly, as “bonds issued by
large financial institutions backed by pools of individual home mortgages.” See Press
Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney
General Cuomo Announces Landmark Reform Agreements with the Nation's Three
Principal Credit Rating Agencies (June 5, 2008); see also Bruce D. Fisher, A Simple
Explanation of Some Legal and Economic Aspects of the Financial Meltdowns of
Banks, 89-MAR MICH. B.J. 38, 41 (2010) (noting that mortgage-backed securities
“formed the foundation for this crisis … and [once] the true nature of those assets
became clear, they declined severely in value, the banks‟ lending capacity contracted,
and the current financial crisis ensued.”).
4
See, e.g., Graham Bowley, Strong Year for Goldman, as It Trims Bonus Pool, N.Y.
TIMES, January 21, 2010, at B1 (“Despite a record 2009, the bank announced that it had
set aside only $16.2 billion to reward its employees.”) (emphasis supplied to express an
appropriate level of outrage).
5
This may be an overstatement, as many mutual funds invested in asset-backed
securities and contributed to the financial crisis, but we will ignore this fact to foster
some sympathy for our protagonist.
6
Robert A. Robertson & Bradley W. Paulson, A Methodology for Mutual Fund
Derivative Investments, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 237, 237 (1995) (“Recent events
involving the use of derivative investments by mutual funds have cast some doubt onto
a method of investing once considered „safe,‟ and have revealed a need for guidelines
on the use of these investments.”).
7
See, e.g., Michael M. Grynbaum, Fed Moves to Shore Up More Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
October 22, 2008, at B1 (“For decades, Americans have considered money-market
mutual funds as safe as bank accounts.”).
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to a practice known as “market timing.” Market timing, the trading of
mutual fund stock in a manner that exploits pricing inefficiencies, is not
illegal.8 It is, however, costly, and it is disfavored by the SEC because it
harms long-term investors.9 Unfortunately for our underwriter, his
mutual fund permits market timing, and he believes that his sales suffer
as a result.
But our underwriter notices a happy mistake in the most recent
draft of his mutual fund‟s prospectus. Someone (our underwriter does
not know the culprit) included a detailed description of the mutual fund‟s
prohibition on market timing. This is included despite the fact that our
underwriter knows his mutual fund actively encourages market timing.
Though untrue, our underwriter suspects that the statement might help
his flagging sales.
While he may lack scruples, our underwriter is not ignorant. He
knows, for example, that Rule 10b-5(b), promulgated under the
Exchange Act of 1934, prohibits anyone selling securities from making
untrue statements of material fact.10 He also knows that this rule has an
unsettling and vaguely sinister reach. Curious of his potential liability, he
turns to recent case law to gauge his concern. To his surprise, a recent
ruling in the First Circuit gives our underwriter an opportunity to use the
prospectus to sell his shares without running afoul of Rule 10b-5(b).
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Tambone,11 with a
similar set of facts, the First Circuit held that underwriters using such a
misrepresentation are not liable under Rule 10b-5(b).12 Because the
underwriters did not draft the prospectus, the First Circuit reasoned that
they did not “make” the misrepresentation.13 Rather, the First Circuit
held that the underwriters merely used the misrepresentation, and they
could not therefore be held liable under Rule 10b-5(b).14
The Tambone majority relied upon statutory construction and
Supreme Court precedent to reach this rather disconcerting decision.15
8

See Mutual Fund Market Timing, 52-JAN FED. LAW. 28, 30.
SEC v. Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *2 (C.A.1 (Mass.)) (“According to the SEC,
market timing, though not illegal per se, can harm other fund investors and, therefore, is
commonly barred (or at least restricted) by those in charge of mutual funds.”).
10
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
11
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *12.
12
Id. at *12.
13
Id. at *6.
14
Id.
15
See, infra, PART VI.
9
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The majority described the Tambone case as “one of those happy
occasions when the language and the structure of a rule, the statutory
framework that it implements, and the teachings of the Supreme Court
coalesce to provide a well-lit decisional path.”16 However, this rather
confident characterization is belied by a lengthy and convincing dissent
by Judge Kermit Lipez.17
This article argues that the Tambone decision unnecessarily
constrains the enforcement powers of the SEC, leaves our hypothetical
underwriter free of liability, provides a perverse incentive for prospectus
drafters to be as poorly informed as possible, and is contrary to both the
intent behind Rule 10b-5(b) and the current desire to increase regulatory
scrutiny of financial markets. This article also argues that the majority‟s
policy-based rationale–discouraging frivolous lawsuits–does not justify
limiting the SEC‟s enforcement power under Rule 10b-5(b). In order to
fully appreciate the decision, Part II defines some necessary terms,
briefly summarizes the SEC‟s allegations, and describes the procedural
posture of the case. Part III discusses the Tambone decision, including a
detailed analysis of the majority‟s justifications and the dissent‟s
rebuttal. Part IV identifies and discusses the majority‟s policy reason for
the decision: the concern over frivolous lawsuits. Part V posits that the
desire to limit frivolous lawsuits, however praiseworthy, does not justify
curtailing the enforcement powers of the SEC, and Part VI concludes
with a hypothetical that exposes the potentially disastrous outcome of
this decision.
II.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. TAMBONE
A.

Some Necessary Definitions

Before delving into the substance of the Tambone decision, it is
necessary to explore some of the terms used in the complaint. More
specifically, it is important to establish a basic understanding of mutual
funds, the role of underwriters, market timing, the definition and purpose
of a prospectus, and the origin and content of Rule 10b-5(b).18

16

Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *12.
Id. at *15.
18
Although these are relatively familiar terms, it is important to note that the crux of
this case turned, in part, on the definition of the word “make.” See, infra, PART III.A.
17

3
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2030430

USING MISSTATEMENTS OF MATERIAL FACT UNDER RULE 10b-5(b)

1.

Mutual Funds and Market Timing

A “mutual fund” is the more common name for a regulated
investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940.19 The
SEC monitors mutual funds for compliance with the Investment
Company Act,20 and the SEC‟s website provides the following,
attractively succinct, definition:
A mutual fund is a company that brings together
money from many people and invests it in stocks,
bonds or other assets. The combined holdings of
stocks, bonds or other assets the fund owns are
known as its portfolio. Each investor in the fund
owns shares, which represent a part of these
holdings.21
Investment in a mutual fund differs from investment in more traditional
companies. In a more traditional company, a share of stock represents a
proportionate fraction of company ownership, the value of which is
based on the aggregate market price of the company.22 Because a mutual
19

15 U.S.C. § 80a-3.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(c), 80a-37(a) (The Commission “is empowered to make rules
and regulations to the same extent, covering the same subject matter, and for the
accomplishment of the same ends as the [Investment Company Act of 1940]”) (internal
quotations omitted); See also Jean W. Gleason et al., Fund Director’s Guidebook, 52
BUS. LAW. 229, 251 (1996), noting that
[t]he SEC actively monitors each fund‟s operations for compliance with
the [Investment Company Act of 1940], primarily through periodic onsite inspections of the books and records of the fund and adviser that
are required to be maintained and through review of disclosure
documents required to be filed with the SEC. Inspections for cause may
also result from any of a number of events such as direct receipt by the
SEC of an investor complaint, questions presented through a
congressional inquiry, problems raised during SEC review of a filing,
or issues identified by the SEC staff from newspaper articles or
investment company advertisements.
21
http://www.sec.gov/investor/tools/mfcc/mutual-fund-help.htm (italics in original);
see also Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman & Carla G. Teodoro, Forming, Organizing and
Operating a Mutual Fund: Legal and Practical Considerations, 1612 PLI/Corp 9, 13
(2007) (noting that mutual funds “are companies that hold pools of portfolio securities
(and perhaps other assets such as options, futures, loans, cash or cash equivalents) and
issue securities that provide investors with an interest in the pool.”).
22
A share of corporate stock represents “a proportional part of certain rights in a
corporation during its existence, and in the assets upon dissolution, and evidence of the
20
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fund creates value through investment in other companies, the value of a
mutual fund share is dependent on the collective value of the mutual
fund‟s investments.23 Thus, it is often said that a single mutual fund
share provides access to a diversified investment portfolio without the
necessity of purchasing stock from multiple companies.24
More importantly, mutual fund shares differ from those of more
traditional companies because there is no secondary market for mutual
funds.25 In other words, an investor wishing to sell mutual fund stock
does not have the right to sell the share to another investor. Instead, a
holder of mutual fund stock must tender the share to the mutual fund for
a price equal to the net asset value at the time of redemption.26 The
determination of the net asset value of a mutual fund share is calculated
by determining the aggregate value of the mutual fund‟s investments.27
stockholder‟s ratable share in the distribution of the assets on the winding up of the
corporation‟s business. (See BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY, 1376, citing Dep‟t of Treasury
of Indiana v. Crowder, 15 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1938)).
23
As described by the Supreme Court, “the business of a mutual fund consists of
buying stock for its own account and of issuing and selling stock or other securities
evidencing an undivided and redeemable interest in the assets of the fund.” Investment
Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 625 (1971); see also United States v. National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1975) (noting that a
mutual fund “invests in the securities of other corporations and issues securities of its
own. Shares in [a mutual fund] thus represent proportionate interests in its investment
portfolio, and their value fluctuates in relation to the changes in value of the securities
it owns.”).
24
DUNCAN E. OSBORNE & ELIZABETH MORGAN SCHURIG, 2 ASSET PROTECTION: DOM.
& INT'L L. & TACTICS § 28:101 (stating that, in a mutual fund, “individual investors
with mutual investment objectives … pool their resources in order to take advantage of
the resulting economies of scale and diminished risk through diversification.”).
25
Joseph Lanzkron, The Hedge Fund Holdup: The SEC’s Repeated Unnecessary
Attacks on the Hedge Fund Industry, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1509, 1543 (2008) (noting that
“shares of mutual funds are bought and sold back to the fund itself and are not traded
on a secondary market exchange.”)
26
See Gleason, supra, note 20 at 251 (“Mutual funds continuously offer their shares
and are obligated, upon presentation to the fund, to redeem the shares for current net
asset value within seven days after tender of the shares.”).
27
Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulation and Scholarship: Constant
Companions or Occasional Bedfellows?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 97 (Winter 2009)
The value of the mutual fund is determined every day by calculating
the value of each of the fund‟s investments; the value of each investor‟s
shares, referred to as the “Net Asset Value” …, is then the mutual fund
value divided by the number of outstanding shares in the mutual fund.
Each share owned by an investor can be sold back to the mutual fund
for the [net asset value]. Likewise, new or additional investments in the
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Although comprised of a number of securities, the values of which ebb
and flow over the course of a trading day, the net asset value of a mutual
fund (and therefore, the value of a share of a mutual fund) remains fixed
for that day.28
Market timing is an investment strategy that takes advantage of
the time delay in mutual fund pricing.29 Through market timing, an
investor exploits the fact that the portfolio stock prices used to set a
mutual fund‟s net asset value change after the net asset value is
established.30 To engage in this practice, also known as “time zone
arbitrage,” an investor trades on knowledge known but not yet reflected
by the markets.31 This is most likely to occur when a mutual fund
contains securities traded on markets that span several time zones.32 For
mutual fund are made by buying shares in the mutual fund at the
appropriate [net asset value].
Or, in the less transparent language of the Investment Company Act, shares of a
mutual fund can only be sold and redeemed at a price that
bear[s] such relation to the current net asset value of such security …
for the purpose of eliminating or reducing ... any dilution of the value
of other outstanding securities of such company or any other result of
such purchase, redemption or sale which is unfair to holders of such
other outstanding securities.
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22.
28
DH2, Inc. v. U.S. S.E.C., 422 F.3d 591, 592 (C.A. 7,2005) (“A mutual fund‟s share
price does not fluctuate throughout the trading day, but the prices of the securities held
by the fund do. The ever-changing portfolio security prices are aggregated into a single
daily fund price known as the net asset value …, which is generally fixed by a fund
when the major U.S. stock markets close.”).
29
See, William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and
Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1453 (2006)
[T]he term „market-timing‟ has no fixed definition in the extensive
investment advisory literature and regulations. As investigations by the
SEC and others evolved, however, regulators eventually made clear
that the market-timing of which they disapproved encompassed a
variety of investing techniques involving arbitrage of mutual fund share
prices through the use of timed transactions.
30
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 637 (2006) (describing “market
timing” as “exploit[ing] brief discrepancies between the stock prices used to calculate
the … value [of the mutual fund shares] once a day, and the prices at which those
stocks are actually trading in the interim.”).
31
S.E.C. v. Gann, 565 F.3d 932, 934-35 (C.A.5 (Tex., 2009) (“Market timers typically
buy and sell shares of a mutual fund quickly to take advantage of minute, short-term
differentials between a fund‟s value and the value of the securities it holds.”).
32
As described by the SEC in a Congressional report, “[m]utual funds that invest in
overseas securities markets are particularly vulnerable to market timers” who could
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example, if a mutual fund‟s investment portfolio contains securities
traded in both New York and London exchanges, an investor in New
York could know the closing price of a security traded in London about
four hours before the close of the New York exchange. 33 Because the
value of a mutual fund is calculated using the closing prices of the
securities in their respective exchanges, an investor savvy in foreign
markets could buy or sell mutual fund shares based on the anticipated
price changes due to economic news not accounted for in a mutual
fund‟s net asset value.34
Such a practice, although not specifically barred by rule or law,35
has been recognized by the SEC as harmful to mutual fund investors that
do not engage in market timing.36 The frequent trading by market timers
increases transaction costs at the expense of long-term investors.37 In
recognition of this harm, the SEC proposed a rule that requires mutual
buy or sell “fund shares based on events occurring after foreign market closing prices
are established …, but before the events have been reflected in the fund‟s” net asset
value. See Brief for SEC, Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 (2010), at 11.
33
DH2, Inc., 422 F.3d at 593 (“The potential for exploiting stale market prices
increases as one moves east, given the larger time zone disparities between eastern time
and the Japanese or Hong Kong markets.”); See also Eric Zitzewitz, Who Cares About
Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual Funds, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 245, 246
(2003)
Investors can take advantage of mutual funds that calculate their [net
asset values] using stale closing prices by trading based on recent
market movements. For example, if the U.S. market has risen since the
close of overseas equity markets, investors can expect that overseas
markets will open higher the following morning. Investors can buy a
fund with a stale-price [net asset value] for less than its current value,
and they can likewise sell a fund for more than its current value on a
day that the U.S. market has fallen.
34
See generally, Mutual Fund Market Timing, supra, note 8, at 30; see also DH2, Inc.,
422 F.3d at 593 (noting that those that practice market timing “make profits with slight
risk to themselves, diverting gains from the mutual funds‟ long-term investors while
imposing higher administrative costs on the funds (whose operating expenses rise with
each purchase and redemption.”).
35
See Mutual Fund Market Timing, supra, note 8, at 30 (“[N]o rule, regulation, or
common law prohibits market timing.”).
36
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *2 (“According to the SEC, market timing, though
not illegal per se, can harm other fund investors and, therefore, is commonly barred (or
at least restricted) by those in charge of mutual funds.”).
37
Gann, 565 F.3d at 935 (noting that mutual funds “object that market timers‟ gains
come at the expense of long-term investors and increase transaction costs, so such
companies employ a number of strategies to discover and impede traders engaging in
the practice.”).
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funds “to disclose in their prospectuses … the risks … of the frequent
purchase and redemption of investment company shares, and the …
policies and procedures with respect to such frequent purchases and
redemptions.”38 The proposal does not, however, indicate that market
timing is illegal, and although some mutual funds have taken steps to
prohibit market timing, 39 the practice continues to be an issue.40
2.

Underwriters and Prospectuses

Generally, an underwriter is any party that purchases securities
from an issuer in connection with the issuer‟s distribution of such
securities.41 In basic terms, an underwriter matches buyers with sellers.42
38

SEC Release Nos. 33-8343; IC-26287; File No. S7-26-03, RIN 3235-AI99,
Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings,
17 CFR Parts 239 and 274.
39
Gann 565 F.3d at 935.
Brokers who time the market sometimes receive „block notices‟ from
funds in which they have bought and sold shares. A block notice
typically informs the broker that he has run afoul of a fund's restrictions
and bars specified accounts controlled by the broker from future trades.
Brokers can be identified by their registered representative number;
clients can be identified by their account number or numbers. A block
notice might bar trades under the broker's number, the client's account
number, or the number attached to a brokerage or its branch office.
But see Zitzewitz, supra, note 33, at 245-46 (“Despite the fact that this arbitrage
opportunity has been understood by the industry for 20 years and heavily exploited
since at least 1998, the fund industry was still taking only limited action to protect its
long-term shareholders as of late 2002.”).
40
See Zitzewitz, supra note 33 at 245 (noting that “[d]espite … pressure from the
Securities and Exchange Commission …, the vast majority of funds are not marketupdating their prices to eliminate [net asset value] predictability and dilution, but are
instead pursuing solutions that are only partly effective.”).
41
See, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(11)
The term “underwriter” means any person who has purchased from an
issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with,
the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect
participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a
participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such
undertaking.
See also Eric Seitz, Underwriter Due Diligence: “It’s [Not] a Whole New Ballgame,”
61 SMU L. REV. 1633, 1638 (Fall 2008) (“In a securities offering, the basic role of an
underwriter is to act as an intermediary between the issuer and the investor”).
42
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 308 F.Supp.2d 338, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (defining
an underwriter as a “person who buys securities directly or indirectly from the issuer

8
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Responsible for the pricing,43 the sale44 and the general organization of
an issuance, the underwriter plays a vital role in a securities offering.
Often, the underwriter serves as the primary point of contact for
investors. It has been suggested that investors seek out the underwriter
not only because of the underwriter‟s relationship with the issuer, 45 but
also because an underwriter‟s raison d’être is the evaluation of securities
and their issuers.46 On a more practical level, an investor might find
comfort in the knowledge that the underwriter‟s profit is often linked to
the success of the issuer.47
Due to the unique role of underwriters in securities issuances and
the fact that they are privy to facts and data unavailable to the investing
public, courts have imposed a duty upon underwriters to make an
appropriate investigation into the offering48 and the issuer.49 As stated
and resells them to the public, or performs some act (or acts) that facilitates the issuer's
distribution.”).
43
Christine Hur, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, CARDOZO L. REV. 711,
724 (January 2005) (“[T]he underwriter has primary responsibility for pricing the IPO
shares and for distributing them.”)
44
See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The sale of fund
shares to new investors is generally the responsibility of a „principal underwriter‟ who
is usually the adviser itself or a close affiliate.”).
45
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975) (noting that “[a]n
underwriter‟s relationship with the issuer gives the underwriter access to facts that are
not equally available to members of the public who must rely on published
information.”).
46
Katina J. Dorton, Auctioning New Issues of Corporation Securities, 71 VA. L. REV.
1381, 1390 (1985) (“An issuer is only an occasional participant in the capital markets,
but underwriters have frequent, direct contact with the markets and have developed an
expertise in pricing securities.”); see also Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that an underwriter “is most heavily
relied upon to verify published materials because of his expertise in appraising the
securities issue and the issuer, and because of his incentive to do so. He is familiar with
the process of investigating the business condition of a company and possesses
extensive resources for doing so.”).
47
See generally, Chris-Craft, 480 F.2d at 370 (noting the underwriter “often has a
financial stake in the issue,” and thus “has a special motive to thoroughly investigate
the issuer‟s strengths and weaknesses.”).
48
See generally, Id. (noting that “[p]rospective investors look to the underwriter, a fact
well known to all concerned and especially to the underwriter, to pass on the soundness
of the security and the correctness of the registration statement and prospectus”); see
also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 12:42 (2d ed.); see also, generally Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589,
595-96 (2d Cir. 1969).
49
See Sanders, 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
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rather succinctly by an Alabama district court, underwriters are “under a
duty to the investing public to make a reasonable investigation of the
issuer … and to disclose material facts that he knew or that were readily
ascertainable.”50 Generally, this investigation must be vigorous enough
to provide a reasonable person with confidence that the statements in the
sales materials are true and comprehensive.51 This investigation involves
more than merely relying on the issuer‟s attestation; an underwriter must
take affirmative steps to test the veracity of the statements in the sales
materials, otherwise known as the prospectus.52
In basic terms, a prospectus is a document used by underwriters
to sell a security. The Securities Act defines “prospectus” broadly to
include any writing “which offers any security for sale or confirms the
sale of any security.”53 A prospectus contains general information about
the offering, including issuer representations, the security‟s cost,
potential risks of the investment, and the issuer‟s past performance.54
Although this description appears pleasantly pro-investor, commentators
have criticized prospectuses as unduly protracted, complicated, and
[T]he relationship between the underwriter and its customers implicitly
involves a favorable recommendation of the issued security. Because
the public relies on the integrity, independence and expertise of the
underwriter, the underwriter‟s participation significantly enhances the
marketability of the security. And since the underwriter is
unquestionably aware of the nature of the public‟s reliance on his
participation in the sale of the issue, the mere fact that he has
underwritten it is an implied representation that he has met the
standards of his profession in his investigation of the issuer.
50
Shores v. M.E. Ratliff Inv. Co. 1982 WL 1559, 3 (N.D. Alabama January 18, 1982)
51
S.E.C. v. Dain Rauscher, Inc. 254 F.3d 852, 858 (C.A.9 2001), citing Municipal
Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26100, 41 SEC Docket 1131
(Sept. 22, 1988), 1988 WL 240748, *20; see also Sanders, 554 F.2d at 793 (7th Cir.
1977) (noting that the investigation must be enough to provide the underwriter with “a
reasonable basis for a belief that the key representations in the statements provided to
the investors were truthful and complete.”).
52
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F.Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y.1968)
To effectuate the statute‟s purpose the phrase „reasonable investigation‟
must be construed to require more effort on the part of the underwriters
than the mere accurate reporting in the prospectus of „data presented‟ to
them by the company. [Underwriters] may not rely solely on the
company‟s officers or on the company‟s counsel.
53
15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(10).
54
See LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS § 3:3.1, at 3-16
(4th ed. 2005); see also the SEC‟s definition, available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/
tools/mfcc/prospectus-help.htm.
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mind-numbing documents.55 Indeed, it has been suggested that the
prospectus disclosures are “boring intentionally, word analgesics to
numb anxious buyers and sellers.”56 Regardless of its efficacy, a
prospectus includes important representations about the issuer and its
business and is the only document required to be given to investors.57
3.

Rule 10b-5(b)

Rule 10b-5(b) of the Exchange Act generally prohibits the use of
misstatements in the sale of securities.58 The rule, in relevant part, states
that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, … [t]o
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”59 To
deduce the rule‟s intent, it is illuminating to examine its origin.
Although Rule 10b-5(b) is one of the SEC‟s primary tools in the
regulation of today‟s intricate securities transactions, the language of the
rule was born out of a desire to stop a stunningly simple fraud.60 Milton
Freeman worked for a nascent SEC in the early 1940s61 and was one of
the authors of Rule 10b-5(b).62 A colleague told Mr. Freeman that a
55

See, e.g., SEC, Form N-1A Adopting Release at 13,916., SM039 ALI-ABA 1 (noting
that “[a]n increasing number of press articles criticized fund prospectuses as
unintelligible, tedious, and legalistic.”); see also Daniel D. Bradlow & Jay Gary
Finkelstein, Training Law Students to be International Transactional Lawyers – Using
an Extended Simulation to Educate Law Students About Business Transactions, 1 J.
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 67, 69 (Fall 2007) (noting that “a securities prospectus is
an extraordinarily complex document--and one of the most boring.”); but see Henry T.
C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV.
777, 843 (2000) (“Perhaps surprisingly, investors consult the prospectus more than any
other source of information about the mutual funds that they buy.”).
56
KURT ANDERSON, TURN OF THE CENTURY.
57
See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2004); see also Kwang-Rok Kim, The Electronic
Disclosure System in the Korean Securities Market: What Do You File on the DART
System in Korea?, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 597, 611 (2004) (noting that because “a
prospectus contains very important information needed to make investment decisions,
the U.S. federal securities laws prohibit transactions of securities if a prospectus is not
first delivered to the investors.”).
58
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
59
Id.
60
Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 892 (1966-1967).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 922 (Mr. Freeman, with an unabashed hubris, described Rule 10b-5 as “the
biggest thing that had ever happened.”).
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company officer was purposely devaluing his company‟s stock in order
to purchase the stock at an artificially low price.63 Recounting the birth
of Rule 10b-5(b) in almost comic detail, Mr. Freeman stated that he
called the Commission and … got on the calendar,
and I don‟t remember whether we got there that
morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of
paper around to all the commissioners. All the
commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on
the table, indicating approval. Nobody said
anything except Sumner Pike who said, „Well,‟ he
said, „we are against fraud, aren‟t we?‟ That is
how it happened.64
This rather romantic reminiscence illustrates the simplicity of the rule‟s
intent: to protect investors from corporate fraud. Indeed, early
interpretations allowed the rule to reach virtually any conduct that
resulted in a fraud upon investors.65
B.

SEC v. Tambone: The Parties

Tambone involved a registered broker-dealer called Columbia
Funds Distributor, Inc. (Distributor).66 James Tambone was a copresident of Distributor and Robert Hussey was a managing director.67
The First Circuit goes through great pains to describe the “tangled web
63

Freeman, supra, note 60 at 922. As recalled by Mr. Freeman,
the president of some company in Boston … [was] going
around buying up the stock of his company from his own
shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he [was] telling [the
shareholders] that the company [was] doing very badly,
whereas, in fact, the earnings [were expected ] to be
quadrupled and [the price of the stock would] be $2.00 a
share for this coming year.
64
Id. The amusingly superfluous aside as to whether the Commission met “that
morning or after lunch” is included to emphasize the iconic position that the rule has
assumed.
65
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976) (noting that Rule 10b-5(b)
“could be read as proscribing, respectively, any type of material misstatement or
omission, and any course of conduct, that has the effect of defrauding investors,
whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not.”).
66
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *1.
67
Id.
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of interlocking entities” at issue in this case, but the only entities
germane to the discussion are Distributor, Columbia Management Group
(Management) and Columbia Management Advisors, Inc. (Advisors).68
Distributor, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Management, acted as an
underwriter by selling shares and distributing prospectuses for over 140
mutual funds.69 Such prospectuses, and the representations therein, were
drafted by employees of Advisors.70 There was no allegation by the SEC
that either Mr. Tambone or Mr. Hussey were employees of either
Management or Advisors during the relevant time period.71
C.

Facts and Procedural Posture

The SEC alleged that, despite a representation in the prospectus
to the contrary, 72 the Columbia family of mutual funds allowed market
timing and that Messrs. Tambone and Hussey intentionally used this
falsehood to sell shares in violation of Rule 10b-5(b).73 The SEC also
charged the defendants with breaching an implied representation that
they had a reasonable basis to believe that the prospectus was accurate
and complete.74
At district court, the defendants were granted a motion to dismiss
based on a lack of the particularity requirement of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b)75 and a failure to state a claim.76 On appeal, a divided
68

Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *1.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at *2.
72
Id. The text of the representation follows:
The Fund does not permit short-term or excessive trading in its shares.
Excessive purchases, redemptions or exchanges of Fund shares disrupt
portfolio management and increase Fund expenses. In order to promote
the best interests of the Fund, the Fund reserves the right to reject any
purchase order or exchange request particularly from market timers or
investors who, in the advisor‟s opinion, have a pattern of short-term or
excessive trading or whose trading has been or may be disruptive to the
Fund.
73
Brief for SEC, supra note 32, at 7. (Alleging that the defendants “marketed and sold
fund shares by means of the misleading prospectuses, allowing the prospectuses to be
disseminated and referring clients to … the prospectuses for information on the
funds.”).
74
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *3.
75
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”).
69
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panel of the First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the SEC properly
alleged that Messrs. Tambone and Hussey made false statements.77 The
defendants petitioned for, and were granted, en banc review on the Rule
10b-5(b) claim by the First Circuit.78
III.

THE FIRST CIRCUIT‟S HOLDING, ITS RATIONALE, AND A REBUTTAL

The majority opinion in Tambone, drafted by Judge Bruce M.
Selya, ultimately held that the SEC‟s interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b) was
untenable.79 To reach this conclusion, the majority held that the
definition of “make” in Rule 10b-5(b) was too narrow to encompass the
defendants‟ acts, and that a breach of an underwriter‟s implied duty did
not give rise to primary liability under Rule 10b-5(b).80 As discussed
below, however, the majority‟s arguments are dissected, point-by-point,
by Judge Kermit Lipez‟s persuasive dissent.
A.

The Definition of “Make” in Rule 10b-5(b)

The core inquiry in SEC v. Tambone, as framed by the majority,
is whether Messrs. Tambone and Hussey made untrue statements within
the meaning of Rule 10b-5(b).81 Asserting that the crucial word in Rule
10b-5(b) is “make,” the majority set out to test the SEC‟s proposed
definition.82 Although it has been said that “[n]o honest and reasonable
citizen could have difficulty in understanding the meaning of „untrue,‟
„material fact,‟ „any omission to state a material fact,‟ „in light of the
circumstances under which they were made,‟ or „misleading,‟” the
majority found it necessary to define “make.”83 To divine the word‟s
76

SEC v. Tambone, 473 F.Supp.2d 162, 168 (D.Mass. 2006) (holding that the
defendants could not be held liable as primary violators for misstatements that the
defendants did not draft).
77
SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 135 (1 st Cir. 2008).
78
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *4.
79
Id. at *12.
80
Id.
81
Id. at *5.
82
Id. (declaring “make” the “pivotal word”). The majority‟s definitional odyssey
reminds the author of President Bill Clinton‟s famous quote that his answer “depends
on what the meaning of the word „is‟ is.” See Kenneth Starr, A Referral to the United
States House of Representatives pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, § 595(c), H.
R. Doc. 105-310, at 125 n.1091 (1998).
83
See U.S. v. Persky 520 F.2d 283, 287 (C.A.N.Y. 1975).
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definition, the majority applied three traditional methods of statutory
construction: determination of the ordinary meaning of the word;84
analysis of the structure of Rule 10b,85 and review of Supreme Court
precedent.
1.

The Ordinary Meaning of “Make”

Faced with an undefined term in a statute, the majority followed
the traditional rule of statutory construction of resorting to the word‟s
ordinary meaning.86 To do this, the majority consulted dictionary
definitions,87 noting that Black‟s Law Dictionary‟s definition of “make”
is to “cause (something) to exist” and that Webster‟s Third New
International Dictionary defines “make” as to “create [or] cause.”88
Using these references, the majority settled on a definition that stressed
the actual creation of the misstatement,89 and was quick to emphasize
that the Commission‟s proposed definition of “make”–something akin to
“delivery”–conflicted with this definition.90
The majority confirmed this definition by examining the use of
other verbs in Rule 10b. The majority found the verb used in Rule 10b5(a) illuminating. Rule 10b-5(a) prohibits the “employ[ment]” of a

84

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) (“When a word is not defined by
statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.”).
85
Affiliated Ute v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (“[T]he second subparagraph of
[Rule 10b] specifies the making of an untrue statement of a material fact and the
omission to state a material fact. The first and third paragraphs are not so restricted.”).
86
Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. 541 U.S. 246, 253,
(2004) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress
and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose.”) quoting Park „N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S.
189, 194 (1985). See also In re Hill, 562 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that, in
general, words in a statute carry their ordinary meanings if not specially defined).
87
See Johnson v. Aljian, 490 F.3d 778, 780 (9th Cir.2007) (“[W]e follow the common
practice of consulting dictionary definitions to clarify their ordinary meaning [ ] and
look to how the terms were defined at the time [the statute] was adopted.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original))
88
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *5, citing WEBSTER‟S THIRD NEW INT‟L DICT. 1363
(2002) and BLACK‟S LAW DICT. 1041 (9th ed. 2009).
89
It is important to note, however, that the majority was careful to state that “This case
does not require us to set forth a comprehensive test for determining when a speaker
may be said to have made a statement.” See Id. at *6.
90
Id. (“It is enough to say that the SEC‟s purported reading of the word is inconsistent
with each of these definitions.”).
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device, scheme or artifice to defraud.91 Characterizing “employ” as more
expansive than “make,” a characterization that itself is dubious,92 the
majority held that the drafters deliberately chose a more narrow verb for
of Rule 10b-5(b).93 The implication is that had the drafters of Rule 10b5(b) used the word “employ” rather than “make,” the Commission‟s
allegations might have been appropriate. However, according to the
majority, to adopt the Commission‟s interpretation of “make” would be
to ignore the difference between “employ” and the “significantly
different (and narrower) verb contained in Rule 10b-5(b).”94 The
majority stated, in a moment of hyperbolic condescension, that “[w]ord
choices have consequences, and this word choice virtually leaps off the
page.”95 Suggesting that the Commission‟s definition would overstep the
intended regulatory reach of Rule 10b-5(b),96 the majority refused to
entertain the Commission‟s proposed definition of “make.”97
In dissent, Judge Lipez pointed out that the majority was perhaps
a bit too selective in the chosen definitions of “make.” Hinting that the
majority took an ultra-literal approach,98 the dissent asserted that “it
defies ordinary experience to say that a statement can only be „made‟ by
the physical or manual act of writing or transcribing or speaking
words.”99
To support the claim that it is common to say that one “makes” a
statement through conduct, the dissent highlighted dictionary definitions
of “make” that do not exclusively refer to acts of creation.100 For
example, The Random House Dictionary defines “make” to include acts

91

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
See generally, infra, PART III.A.1.
93
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *6 (citing the rule‟s grant to the SEC of “broad
authority to proscribe conduct that „use[s] or employ[s]‟ any „manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance.”).
94
Id. (characterizing the difference as “obvious.”).
95
Id.
96
The court refused to “rewrite an administrative rule to sweep more broadly than its
language permits.” See Id.
97
Id. at *10. (noting that the SEC‟s “attempt to impute statements to persons who may
not have had any role in their creation, composition, or preparation falls well short.”).
98
Id. at *19. (noting that “the statutory language [of Rule 10b-5(b)] is broad enough to
encompass less literal forms of „making‟ a statement.”).
99
Id., citing State v. O‟Neil, 24 Idaho 582 (1913) (internal quotations omitted).
100
Id.
92
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such as “delivering” and “putting forth.”101 If the majority were to have
used this definition, the SEC‟s allegation that the defendants made the
misrepresentation by delivering the prospectus would be credible.102
Rather than merely suggesting an alternate definition, the dissent
forwarded a rather convincing reason to use this definition: precedent.
The dissent cites the Fourth Circuit‟s decision in Reass v. United
States,103 which held that a statute‟s reference to “making” a false
statement should encompass not only the composition of the statement,
but also the communication of the statement.104 Thus, the majority‟s
definition of “make” is arguably too narrow, and there is persuasive
(albeit nonbinding) authority supporting the SEC‟s suggested
definition.105
2.

Defining “Make” Through Examination of the
Structure and Intent of Rule 10b-5

Not content to rely upon a selectively-chosen dictionary
definition of “make,” the First Circuit majority examined the statute that
Rule 10b-5(b) drafters used as a model: section 17(a) of the Securities
Act.106 Section 17(a) states, in relevant part, that it is illegal to “obtain
money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact.”107 The court noted the difference between this language and Rule
10b-5(b), stating that “the drafters of Rule 10b-5 had before them
language that would have covered the „use‟ of an untrue statement of
material fact,” and that the authors of Rule 10b-5 “easily could have
copied that language.”108 The result of this difference, according to the
101

Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *19, quoting THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF
1161 (2d. 1987).
102
Id.
103
99 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1938).
104
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *19, citing Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752 (4th
Cir. 1938), interpreting the word “make” in a federal mortgage fraud statute to include
“communicating [the statement] and not merely composing” the statement.
105
Id. (noting that “the fact remains that the [Fourth Circuit] did not confine „making a
statement‟ to the literal meaning on which the majority insists.”).
106
United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that Section 17(a)
“is almost identical to, and indeed was the model for, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5”)
citing Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 n. 4 (5th Cir.
1960).
107
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2).
108
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *7. Suggesting, it would seem, a Rule 10b-5(b) that
would read as follows:
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
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majority, is that Rule 10b-5(b) was deliberately drafted in a more
restrictive manner to encompass a more narrow family of activities.109
In dissent, Judge Lipez noted that the majority‟s interpretation
failed to give proper deference to the intent of the drafters of Rule 10b5(b).110 Regardless of the rule‟s predecessor, the SEC‟s interpretation of
the word “make” is necessary to “fulfill the objective of Congress and
the Commission to punish „any untrue statement of a material fact‟ made
with knowledge or reckless disregard for its truth.”111 The dissent argued
that if an underwriter delivers a prospectus to investors with the
knowledge that it contains a misstatement, it “takes no stretch of the
language of Rule 10b-5(b) to view such an underwriter as having attested
to the accuracy of the prospectus contents.”112 Although admitting that
the rule “contemplates some range of conduct narrower than the statute‟s
all-encompassing „use or employ,‟” the dissent stressed that this does not
foreclose the possibility “that particular uses of statements by particular
players in the sale of securities … constitute the „making‟ of implied
statements.”113 Thus, the majority allowed a rather pedantic examination
of Rule 10b-5(b)‟s predecessor to trump the intent of the rule.
3.

Supreme Court Precedent and “Primary” vs.
“Secondary” Liability under Rule 10b-5

After satisfying itself that both the ordinary dictionary meaning
of “make” and the statute‟s use of more expansive verbs were contrary to
the SEC‟s proposed definition, the majority argued that Supreme Court
it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to obtain
money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading.
109
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *7. (noting that “the drafters–who faithfully tracked
section 17(a) in other respects–deliberately eschewed the expansive language of section
17(a)(2).”).
110
Id. at *20.
111
Id. at *20, (quoting Rule 10b-5(b)).
112
Id. at *20. The dissent continues to state that, through such delivery, the
underwriters “have knowingly „made‟ an implied-false-statement to investors that the
prospectus accurately describes the fund‟s risks.” (citing Hanly, 415 F.2d at 597 (2d
Cir. 1969) (“By [an underwriter‟s] recommendation he implies that a reasonable
investigation has been made and that his recommendation rests on the conclusions
based on such investigation.”)).
113
Id. at *20.
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cases were in conflict with the SEC‟s interpretation.114 The majority
noted that the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of the
definition of the word “make” in Rule 10b-5(b), but stated that the SEC‟s
definition would cause tension in the Supreme Court‟s rulings regarding
primary and secondary liability under Rule 10b-5(b).115
In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A.,116 the Supreme Court established a private right of action
under Rule 10b against “primary” (as opposed to “secondary”) violators
of securities laws.117 In the context of Rule 10b, a primary violator is the
party responsible for the misrepresentation or untrue statement, and a
secondary violator would be any party that, for example, aids or abets in
the making of the misrepresentation or untrue statement.118
In Central Bank, a public building authority issued bonds to
finance a public improvement project.119 The value of the bonds
dramatically decreased, and several bondholders sued a number of
parties under Rule 10b-5(a).120 Rule 10b-5(a), in relevant part, makes it
unlawful to “directly or indirectly … use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security …, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance.”121 The plaintiffs argued that the “directly or
indirectly” language of Rule 10b-5(a) should extend to cover parties that
aid and abet the employment of a manipulative or deceptive device.122
After review of the statutory language, the Central Bank court disagreed,
noting that the “directly or indirectly” language does not give rise to
aiding and abetting liability,123 reasoning that to impose such liability on
parties who give “a degree of aid” to primary violators would reach
parties outside the intended penumbra of the rule.124
114

Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *8
Id.
116
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
117
Id. at 191.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 167.
120
Id.
121
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
122
Cent. Bank 511 U.S. at 164.
123
Id. at 175. (noting that “federal courts have not relied on the „directly or indirectly‟
language when imposing aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b).”).
124
Id. The Supreme Court stated that “[w]hen Congress wished to provide a remedy to
those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble in doing so
expressly.” citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S., at 734.
115
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The Tambone majority held that the SEC‟s interpretation of Rule
10b-5(b) was contrary to Central Bank.125 Although the majority
acknowledged that Central Bank did not address the definition of
“make” in Rule 10b-5, the majority viewed Central Bank as relevant.
The majority‟s concern was that the SEC‟s interpretation would obscure
the Supreme Court‟s distinction between primary and secondary
liability.126 Noting that “courts must be vigilant to ensure that secondary
violations are not shoehorned into the category reserved for primary
violations,” the majority held that the SEC‟s proposed interpretation
would impermissibly extend primary liability of Rule 10b-5(b).127
Quoting the Second Circuit, the majority concluded that “[i]f Central
Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually make a false
or misleading statement in order to be held liable [as a primary violator]
under section 10(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and
abetting.”128
The dissent found the majority‟s reliance on Central Bank
misplaced. Before tackling the substance of the argument, the dissent
noted that Central Bank‟s holding was concerned with a suit brought by
a private plaintiff, not the SEC.129 The majority‟s decision therefore
ignored the fact that the core issue of the Tambone case involves the
SEC‟s authority to bring claims.130 Central Bank settles the question of
whether a private party can bring a Rule 10b-5(b) claim against aiders
and abettors.131 Central Bank does not, however, settle the question of
whether the SEC can bring a Rule 10b-5(b) claim against them.
125

Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *8 (noting that the Commission‟s interpretation
would be “in tension with Supreme Court precedent” and that “[a]llowing the SEC to
blur the line between primary and secondary violations in this manner would be
unfaithful to the taxonomy of Central Bank.”).
126
Id. (“The SEC‟s position poses a threat to the integrity of [the primary and
secondary] dichotomy.”).
127
Id. at *9. (“[r]eading „make‟ to include the use of a false statement by one other than
the maker would extend primary liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by
the text of Rule 10b-5(b).) Citing 511 U.S. 164, 174.
128
Id., quoting Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997).
129
Id. at *17.
130
Id. (“Although the [Central Bank] Court focused on the text of the provisions, it also
emphasized the element of reliance (which was not satisfied in that case), as well as a
set of policy considerations that arise exclusively in the context of private securities
litigation.” citing Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 173-178, 180,188-89.
131
Id. (“Indeed, the Court has consistently distinguished between the broad contours of
the SEC‟s „express statutory authority to enforce [Rule 10b-5], and the „narrow
dimensions of the implied right of action.” Quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
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Further, by exaggerating the holding of Central Bank, the dissent
charged the majority with artificially extending the case‟s reach.132 The
Central Bank decision only addressed the question of whether Rule 10b
extends to those secondary actors that aid and abet a primary violation.133
The issue in front of the Tambone court, however, did not involve aiding
and abetting. Rather, the issue was whether Messrs. Tambone and
Hussey were primary violators of Rule 10b-5(b).134 Thus, the
primary/secondary dichotomy established in Central Bank is not
threatened by the SEC‟s proposed interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b), and
the basis of the majority‟s holding is questionable.135
B.

The Implied Statement Theory

As noted above, the SEC did not assert that the defendants
drafted the misrepresentations in the prospectus. Rather, the SEC alleged
that Messrs. Tambone and Hussey, by delivering the prospectus to
investors, implied that the statements in the prospectus were true and
complete.136 This implied statement theory is based on an underwriter‟s
duty to investigate the nature and circumstances of an offering.137 The
Tambone majority dismissed the possibility of any implied statements by
Smith v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 79-81 and Stonerigde, 552 U.S. at 167.; see also SEC v.
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002). As stated by the Supreme Court, the Securities
Exchange Act “should be construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate its remedial purposes.”)
132
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *16. (pointing out that the majority‟s argument
“overstates the substance” of Central Bank.).
133
Id., citing Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167.
134
Id. at *17. The dissent noted that the issue is not secondary liability, but “whether
the defendant‟s acts are sufficient to show that they made the [alleged] material
misstatements and omissions … such that they can be held primarily liable.” citing
SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1258 (10 th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted);
(“The issue here is whether the defendants themselves „engage[d] in the manipulative
or deceptive practice.‟”).
135
Id. at *17-18, noting that the issue before the court is not the primary/secondary
dichotomy, but is “whether the defendants have „made‟ a statement, which
unquestionably would subject them to primary liability.”
136
See SEC brief, p. 16 (“[A]s securities professionals directing the offer and sale of
shares on behalf of the underwriter; Tambone and Hussey made their own implied (but
false) representation to investors that they had a reasonable basis for a belief that the
key representations in the prospectuses were truthful and complete.”)
137
See, SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 857 (D.C.Cir. 2001) (“A securities
professional has an obligation to investigate the securities he or she offers to
customers.”) citing Hanly, 415 F.2d at 595-96 (2d Cir. 1969).

21
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2030430

USING MISSTATEMENTS OF MATERIAL FACT UNDER RULE 10b-5(b)

the defendants, noting that the SEC‟s interpretation would create
“mischief” by creating a burdensome duty for underwriters. 138 However,
as argued by the dissent, this duty is not unprecedented and deserves
proper deference.139
1.

The Breach of the Implied Duty of Underwriters

The SEC asserted that Messrs. Tambone and Hussey should be
held primarily liable for their “implied, but false, representations to
investors as to the accuracy of the disclosures made in the
prospectuses.”140 To back up this claim, the Commission cited the duty
of underwriters to conduct a reasonable investigation141 and argued that
an underwriter‟s recommendation of a security implies that the
underwriter has a reasonable basis for belief in the accuracy of the
material representations in a prospectus.142 To bolster this argument, the
SEC cited Seventh Circuit,143 Eighth Circuit144 and Ninth Circuit145
decisions.146 The SEC argued that this implied duty prevents an
underwriter from both “deliberately ignor[ing]” facts that he has a duty
to know and “recklessly stat[ing] facts about matters of which he is
ignorant.”147 An underwriter, according to the SEC, must “analyze sales
138

Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *10.
Id. at *20.
140
Brief for SEC, supra note 32, at 20.
141
Id., citing Chris-Craft, 480 F.2d at 370
[a]n underwriter by participating in an offering constructively
represents that statements made in the registration materials are
complete and accurate. The investing public properly relies upon the
underwriter to check the accuracy of the statements and the soundness
of the offer; when the underwriter does not speak out, the investor
reasonably assumes that there are no disclosed material deficiencies.
142
Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26100 (Sept. 22, 1988).
143
Sanders, 524 F.2d 1064 (stating that “[t]he relationship between the underwriter and
its customers implicitly involves a favorable recommendation of the issued security.”).
144
Alton Box Board Co. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 50 F.2d 916, 922 (8 th Cir. 1977)
(“[B]y holding the notes out as being creditworthy, Goldman Sachs represented that it
had made a thorough investigation on which it based its recommendation.”).
145
Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d at 857-58 (noting that underwriters have
a duty to make an investigation that would provide [the underwriter]
with a reasonable basis for a belief that the key representations in the
statements provided to the investors were truthful and complete.
146
Brief for SEC, supra note 32, at 21.
147
Brief for SEC, supra note 32, at 21.
139
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literature and must not blindly accept recommendations made
therein.”148
2.

Chiarella v. United States

Although recognizing an underwriter‟s duty to investigate the
nature and circumstances of an offering, the First Circuit majority held
that this implied duty does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that an
underwriter “makes” a representation to investors that all the statements
in the prospectus are true and complete.149 Such an interpretation,
according to the majority, “would be tantamount to imposing a freestanding and unconditional duty to disclose” and would be contrary to
Supreme Court precedent.150 To support this claim, the majority cited the
Supreme Court‟s holding in Chiarella v. United States.151
In Chiarella, an employee of a financial printer, privy to
corporate takeover bids printed by his employer, used this knowledge to
purchase stock of potential targets.152 The employee sold the stock for a
profit once the takeover attempts were made public.153 The employee
was indicted, in part, for violation of Rule10b-5.154 The Supreme Court
held that the employee was not liable under the rule, noting that “one
who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so. And the
duty to disclose arises when one party has information „that the other
[party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation
of trust and confidence between them.”155 Thus, Chiarella stands for the
proposition that one must disclose material information only in the face
148

Id., citing Harity v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969) (An underwriter
cannot recommend a security unless there is an adequate and
reasonable basis for such recommendation. He must disclose facts
which he knows and those which are reasonably ascertainable. By his
recommendation, he implies that a reasonable investigation has been
made and that his recommendation rests on the conclusions based on
such investigation.
149
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *10, citing Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d at 857.
150
Id.
151
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
152
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a)
(1976) (emphasis supplied).
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of a pre-existing duty. If the nondisclosing party has no duty, the party
cannot be held liable under Rule 10b-5.
3.

The Majority’s Reliance on Chiarella, and the
Dissent’s Rebuttal

The Tambone majority, citing Chiarella, averred that a duty to
disclose can only be imposed when there is a fiduciary or similar
relationship between the parties.156 Noting that the SEC‟s theory requires
disclosure of information without “the required showing of a fiduciary
relationship,” the majority implied that underwriters have no such
relationship with investors.157 After dismissing the SEC‟s arguments and
precedents as a “cobbled together … bricolage of agency decisions and
statements” in large part because they predate Central Bank, the majority
upheld the dismissal of the SEC‟s claims.158
To rebut the majority‟s cursory dismissal of the implied duty
theory, the dissent cited a litany of decisions where underwriters have
been held subject to Rule 10(b).159 The Ninth Circuit‟s decision in SEC
v. Dain Rauscher, Inc., for example, held that an underwriter‟s failure to
make a sufficient investigation of the truth and accuracy of a disclosure
document was a genuine issue of fact.160 The dissent also cited decisions:
(i) holding that an underwriter‟s delivery of a prospectus was enough to
state a claim under Rule 10b-5;161 (ii) permitting private allegations of
Rule 10b-5 violations against underwriters;162 and (iii) finding

156

Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *10
Id. (noting that “a party‟s nondisclosure of information to another is actionable
under Rule 10b-5 only when there is an independent duty to disclose the information
arising from „a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust or confidence.‟”) quoting
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222.
158
Id. at *11-12.
159
Id. at *21.
160
Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d at 858 (noting that an underwriter “has an obligation
to investigate the securities he or she offers to customers”).
161
In re U.S.A. Classic Sec. Litig., No 93 Civ. 6667 (JSM), 1995 WL 363841, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995) (upholding a complaint that alleged that underwriters
“individually and in concert, directly and indirectly ... engaged and participated in a
course of conduct and conspiracy to conceal adverse material information.‟”).
162
See In re MTC Elec. Techs. S’holder Litig., 993 F.Supp. 160, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
and Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F.Supp. 303, 315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
157
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underwriter liability for intentional material misstatements in a
prospectus.163
The dissent‟s numerous citations along with those cited by the
SEC together cast doubt on the majority‟s dismissive treatment of the
underwriter‟s duty to investors. Noting that underwriters play a unique
role in the issuance of securities, the dissent highlighted a history of
judicial recognition of their duty.164 Citing the D.C. Circuit, the dissent
noted that underwriters have a “heightened obligation” to ensure proper
disclosure.165 Underwriters, privy to information largely withheld from
investors, have a “concomitant duty to investigate and confirm the
accuracy” of the representations in the sales materials they distribute.166
Through delivery of sales material to an investor, an underwriter
represents that he has reviewed the sales material and that he has a
reasonable basis to believe that the representations contained therein are
true and correct.167
Thus, relying on the cited precedent, the dissent stated that “the
knowing or reckless use of a prospectus containing false statements
involves the underwriter‟s own implied statement falsely affirming the
accuracy of the prospectus content.”168 The majority justified its
dismissal of this precedent because it pre-dates the Central Bank
decision.169 But, as noted by the dissent, Central Bank‟s holding has little
to do with underwriter duties170 and therefore does not conflict with the
SEC‟s theory of liability.
163

In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 612 (S.D.
Tex 2002).
164
Tambone 2010 WL 796996 at *22 (noting that “[t]hese precedents reflect the unique
position of underwriters as securities insiders whose role is „that of a trail guide – not a
mere hiking companion,‟ and who are relied upon by investors for their „reputation,
integrity, independence, and expertise.”‟) quoting Dolphin and Bradbury, Inc. v. SEC,
512 F.3d 634, 640-41.
165
Dolphin and Bradbury, Inc., 512 F.3d at 640-41.
166
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *22 (citing Chris-Craft, 480 F.2d at 370 (2d Cir.
1973) and Sanders, 524 F.2d at 1073.
167
Id. at *22, citing Sanders, 524 F.2d at 1073 (noting that “the relationship between
the underwriter and its customers implicitly involves a favorable recommendation of
the issued security…. [A]s an underwriter selling the [security, the underwriter] made
an implied representation that it had reasonable grounds for belief that the [securities]
would be paid at maturity.”).
168
Id.
169
Id. (noting that “[t]he majority attempts to discredit some of this inconvenient
precedent because it pre-dates Central Bank.”).
170
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *22.
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C.

A Summary of the Majority’s Substantive Arguments

Thus, the majority‟s substantive arguments are, at best, open to
question. To hold that the defendants‟ actions did not fall within the
ordinary meaning of the rule, the majority settled upon an unduly narrow
definition of “make,”171 and relied upon a structural analysis of the rule
that utterly ignored the drafter‟s intent.172 The Supreme Court precedent
cited by the majority was irrelevant173 and the majority‟s dismissal of the
SEC‟s implied statement theory failed to properly appreciate the wellestablished duty of underwriters to investigate an offering. Thus, given
the relatively weak substantive arguments for the holding, it is not
surprising that the majority provided a policy-based rationale near the
close of its opinion to explain its decision.
IV.

POLICY REASONS UNDERLYING THE MAJORITY‟S DECISION

Despite declaring that the analysis of case law provided a “welllit decisional path,”174 the majority provided a policy-based argument,
hinting that the decision was not quite so clear-cut. In holding the SEC‟s
argument untenable, the majority stated that “[a]dopting the SEC‟s
implied statement theory would pave the way for suits against securities
professionals for nondisclosure of material information without the
required showing of a fiduciary relationship.”175 Although ostensibly an
argument against eschewing an element of a violation (i.e., the existence
of a fiduciary duty), this statement smacks of a fear of frivolous
lawsuits.176
Although prevention of frivolous lawsuits is an admirable goal,
the First Circuit majority gives this concern too much deference. It is
true that frivolous lawsuits create an undue burden on the judicial
system, but the majority eases this burden to the detriment of the SEC‟s
171

See, supra, PART III.A.1.
See, supra, PART III.A.2.
173
See, supra, PART III.A.3.
174
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *12.
175
Id. at *10.
176
The concurrence latches onto this fear, characterizing the SEC‟s interpretation of
Rule 10b-5 as “alarmingly ambitious” and expressing concern that it would expose
“virtually anyone involved in the underwriting process” to liability. Asserting that “[n]o
one sophisticated about markets believes that multiplying liability is free of cost,” the
concurrence supported the majority‟s decision to limit the SEC‟s enforcement
capabilities in order to minimize these costs. Id. at *13.
172
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enforcement powers. As Supreme Court precedent dictates, the concern
of frivolous lawsuits should not trump the judiciary‟s primary
responsibility to provide a forum for aggrieved parties.177
A.

The Problem of Frivolous Lawsuits

The threat of frivolous lawsuits, long a justification for judicial
action, has been widely reflected in the legislative history of a number of
statutes. For example, the legislative history of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995178 illustrates that the core purpose of the statute was
to curb frivolous litigation by prison inmates,179 and the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2006 “was generally seen as a response to frivolous class
actions.”180 Further, the legislative history of Title VII indicates that
punitive damages under the act were limited to egregious
circumstances181 due to a congressional desire to “prevent excessive
litigation costs,”182 and the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947183 was amended
with an intent to “lessen the number of frivolous lawsuits.”184
Beyond statutes, courts have been known to cite the threat of
frivolous lawsuits as a justification for certain decisions. A district court
in the Southern District of New York stated that courts have a
“constitutional duty to enjoin the filing of frivolous lawsuits in order to

177

See, infra, PART VI.
11 U.S.C. § 523
179
See Jessica Feierman, Symposium, Pro Se Litigation Ten Years After AEDPA, “The
Power of the Pen”: Jailhouse Lawyers, Literacy, and Civic Engagement, 41 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 381 (2006) (“According to advocates of the [PLRA], prisoners
had „tied up the courts with their jailhouse lawyer antics for too long[,] ... making a
mockery of our criminal justice system,‟ and a reform bill would „help put an end to
the inmate litigation fun-and-games.‟”) (citations omitted).
180
Michael A. Satz, Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Our Legal History Demands
Balanced Reform, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 19, 62 (2007) (citing Anna Andreeva, Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight Year Saga is Finally Over, 59 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 385, 398-99, 404-05 (2005)).
181
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
182
See generally, Jason P. Pogorelec, Under What Circumstances Did Congress Intend
to Award Punitive Damages for Victims of Unlawful Intentional Discrimination Under
Title VII?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1269, 1304 -1305 (1999).
183
29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
184
Louise Sadowsky Brock, Overcoming Collective Action Problems: Enforcement of
Worker Rights, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 781, 798 (Summer 1997)
178
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preserve judicial resources.”185 A court in the Southern District of Texas
expressed this sentiment more forcefully (or suffered from a faulty capslock key) by stating that it
makes every reasonable effort to provide a forum
for those truly aggrieved. However, the case at bar
is pure frivolity and a manifest abuse of judicial
process. Such frivolity wastes judicial resources,
prevents utilization of the Court by those who
truly need judicial action, and also feeds the
public‟s apprehensions regarding abusive and
frivolous lawsuits. Plaintiff‟s counsel is more than
welcome to bring cases of merit in this Court;
HOWEVER, FUTURE CASES LIKE THIS
WILL RESULT IN HARSH SANCTIONS.186
The obvious victim of frivolous lawsuits is the defendant forced to
defend meritless claims, but, however melodramatic, the Eighth Circuit
expressed a concern for the health of the entire judicial process by stating
that the “public inevitably suffers when a vindictive plaintiff squanders
limited judicial resources by prosecuting frivolous lawsuits.”187
B.

The Threat of Frivolous Lawsuits Does Not Justify
Limiting SEC Enforcement Power

Although judicial decisions have often barred plaintiff recovery
to avoid a potential onslaught of frivolous lawsuits,188 it is important to
185

Lacy v. Principi, 317 F.Supp.2d 444, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), citing In re MartinTrigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir.1984); see also, Gelabert v. Lynaugh, 894 F.2d
746, 748 (5th Cir.1990)
Like every other pastime, recreational litigation has its price; ...
sanctions ... are imposed for the very purpose of causing the would-be
pro se prisoner litigant, with time on his hands and a disposition to
retaliate against the system, to think twice before cluttering our dockets
with frivolous or philosophical litigation.
186
Uherek v. Houston Light and Power Co. 997 F.Supp. 789, 795 (S.D.Tex.,1998)
(emphasis in the original).
187
American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Teasdale, 733 F.2d 559, 570 (8th Cir.1984).
188
See, e.g., Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 566-68 (9th Cir. 1980) (requiring
exhaustion of remedies under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act); see also
Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259, 1260-61 (2000) (“Congress passed the [Prison
Litigation Reform Act] to reduce frivolous prisoner lawsuits.”)
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weigh the threat of frivolous claims against the much greater evil of
denying a forum for claims with merit. The Supreme Court has solved
this balancing act with the admonition that the threat of frivolous claims
should not influence a judicial decision.189 As eloquently stated by
Justice Souter, “[t]o the degree ... claims are meritorious, fear that there
will be many of them does not provide a compelling reason ... to keep
them from being heard.”190 In the Supreme Court‟s decision in Tower v.
Glover, the court noted that it would be inappropriate to rule simply “in
order to prevent inundation of the federal courts with frivolous lawsuits,”
and held that “[i]t is for Congress to determine whether [particular]
litigation has become too burdensome to state or federal institutions and,
if so, what remedial action is appropriate.”191 As noted by the Tower
court, the judiciary does not have the authority to make decisions based
upon what a court would “judge to be sound public policy.”192
This sentiment is echoed by the dissent. Although plaintiffs may
try to stretch the SEC‟s interpretation of Rule 10b-5, the dissent stressed
that this “predictable and familiar phenomenon” should not convince
courts to limit the enforcement powers of the SEC.193 Further, the SEC‟s
interpretation does not give litigious plaintiffs free-rein to wreak havoc
on the judicial system, as a plaintiff would still be required to meet the
stringent requirements of pleading a securities claim, which requires
pleading the allegation of fraud with particularity, and ultimately proving
reliance, causation and monetary damages.194
Given the procedural bars in place to frustrate meritless claims,
the dissent dismissed the majority‟s policy concern.195 Noting that there
189

See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 410 (As stated by Justice Harlan, “I simply cannot agree ... that the possibility
of „frivolous‟ claims ... warrants closing the courthouse doors…. There are other ways,
short of that, of coping with frivolous lawsuits.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)
190
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 640, fn. 1 (2007).
191
Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984).
192
Id. (“We do not have a license to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the
interests of what we judge to be sound public policy.”)
193
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *23.
194
Id. at *24.
195
Id. (noting that “unlike the SEC,” a private plaintiff must “meet the standard
requirement that allegations of fraud be pleaded with particularity [and] also must prove
reliance on the alleged misrepresentation, economic loss, and loss causation.” The
dissent suggested that “[t]he reliance requirement, in particular, weakened [the
majority‟s] concern that private litigants will be able to bring impermissible aiding and
abetting claims in the guise of primary claims.”)
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are “significant barriers” designed to address the majority‟s concern,
“the way to protect against overreaching by private plaintiffs is to
strictly enforce those requirements – not to deny the SEC the full scope
of its enforcement duty.”196
V.

POLICY REASONS FAVORING THE SEC‟S INTERPRETATION

Given the dissent‟s well-reasoned arguments, policy
considerations were the probable tipping factor for the majority‟s
decision.197 For example, it is not unlikely that the majority might have
reached for the Random House Dictionary over Webster‟s International
if it felt that the policy so dictated. However, the only stated policy
reason for the majority‟s decision was to avoid frivolous lawsuits. This
consideration, laudable as it might be, comes at the expense of narrowing
the SEC‟s enforcement power. Constricting that power not only conflicts
with the intent of Rule 10b-5(b), but also runs contrary to the current
desire of the executive and the American public to increase government
regulation of markets. Further, and perhaps most unfortunately, the
majority provided a blueprint for underwriters and prospectus drafters to
avoid SEC enforcement of Rule 10b-5.
A.

“Well, We Are Against Fraud, Aren’t We?”

To argue that policy considerations weigh in favor of the SEC‟s
interpretation of Rule 10b-5, it is illuminating to recall Mr. Pike‟s
apocryphal statement that suggested that the SEC, in the very least,
should have the authority to prevent fraud.198 While it is absurd to
suggest that the majority is not “against fraud,” the decision strips the
SEC of the tools necessary to prevent and investigate it.
As noted by the Judge Lipez in his dissent, the majority‟s myopic
method of interpreting Rule 10b-5(b) ignores the intent of the rule‟s
drafters.199 Following the majority‟s holding, the dissent hypothesized
that

196

Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at 17. (citing the SEC‟s brief, the dissent noted that
“[p]olicy considerations concerning private litigation can have no relevance in defining
the scope of primary liability under Section 10(b) in a Commission enforcement
action.”).
197
See, supra, PART III.C.
198
Freeman, supra, note 60 at 922.
199
Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *20.
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[a]n underwriter could well know that the
representations in a prospectus are false even
when the individual who actually wrote the words
were unaware of the inaccuracies. In those
circumstances, an underwriter who knowingly
gives investors a prospectus containing falsehoods
could not be held liable in an SEC enforcement
action for aiding and abetting the unwitting
drafter, who did not himself commit fraud. If such
an underwriter could not be held responsible as a
primary offender, the underwriter would … be
free from liability under Section 10(b)
whatsoever.200
As implied by the dissent‟s incredulous tone, this absurdity is the result
of the majority‟s holding. The majority‟s decision leaves the SEC
powerless to prosecute the unscrupulous underwriter and an ignorant
prospectus drafter under Rule 10b-5(b). This decision is even more
disturbing when one considers its potential reach, as it is not limited to
underwriters that trade in mutual fund stock. Any underwriter using a
prospectus containing a misrepresentation may sell securities free from
Rule 10b-5(b) liability as long as the underwriter had no drafting
responsibility. In the face of the Tambone decision, Mr. Pike‟s question,
once rhetorical, is now colored with a sense of unintended profundity.
B.

“We will not go back…”

The Tambone decision not only flies in the face of Rule 10b5(b)‟s intent, but it is patently contrary to the current desire to achieve
investor protection through greater regulatory scrutiny of financial
markets. One would be hard-pressed to find anyone willing to state that
the U.S. financial markets need less regulation.201 Even the most ardent
As the SEC explains in its en banc brief, this understanding of what it
means to „make‟ a statement is necessary to fulfill the objective of
Congress and the Commission to punish „any untrue statement of a
material fact‟ made with knowledge or reckless disregard for its truth.
(quoting Rule 10b-5(b)).
200

Id.
See, e.g., A special report on the world economy: Taming the beast: How far should
finance be re-regulated?, THE ECONOMIST, October 11, 2008, at 66.
201
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supporters of free markets have, albeit reluctantly, admitted that more
regulation is necessary.202 President Barack Obama, both as candidate203
and president, has stressed the need for more regulation of markets, not
less.204 Promising future financial regulatory reform, President Obama
warned investment firm executives that “[w]e will not go back to the
days of reckless behavior and unchecked excess that was at the heart of
this crisis, where too many were motivated only by the appetite for quick
kills and bloated bonuses.”205 This is not mere political bluster, as the

A financial system that ends up with the government taking over some
of its biggest institutions in serial weekend rescues and which requires
the promise of $700 billion in public money to stave off catastrophe is
not an A-grade system. The disappearance of all five big American
investment banks--either by bankruptcy or rebirth as commercial
banks--is powerful evidence that Wall Street failed „the test of the
marketplace.‟ Something has gone awry.
202
Sewell Chan, Looking Back, Greenspan Says Wall Street Needs a Tighter Rein, N.Y.
TIMES, March 19, 2010, at B1 (noting that Alan Greenspan, “famous for his libertarian
leanings and hands-off approach to Wall Street” and “who has long argued that the
market is often a more effective regulator than the government, has now adopted a
more expansive view of the proper role of the state.”).
203
See Christopher Cooper et al., Obama to Receive Endorsement Of 3 Former SEC
Chairmen, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2008 (quoting SEC Chairman William Donaldon as
saying that then-Senator Obama recognized the “need to take a good hard look at how
things are organized [and] “just exactly what went wrong in terms of the regulatory
oversight that we have.”).
204
See David Leonhardt, A Free-Market-Loving, Big-Spending, Fiscally Conservative
Wealth Redistributionist, N.Y. TIMES, AUGUST 24, 2008 (noting that “in Obama‟s view,
the risks to market-based capitalism now have more to do with too little regulation than
too much.”); see also Michael H. Ginsberg, The “Great Recession” and New
Challenges in Product Liability and Environmental Coverage Cases, 2010 WL 561454,
6 (2010) (“We have seen that the Obama Administration is pro-federal regulation in
many ways; therefore, I think we will see a push toward regulation of the financial
markets once we get past the current health care reform movement.”); see also
Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and Financial ReRegulation, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1361, 1418 (2009) (“The Obama Administration has set
forth a series of principles that should reform the regulation of credit default swaps and
other derivatives, these include the following: the development of standardized and
regulated trading platforms; the imposition of capital requirements for issuers of
derivatives; the introduction of mechanisms to improve transparency of derivatives; and
the identification of clear regulatory authority over the derivatives market.”).
205
Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Tough Crowd on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, September 15,
2009 at B1.
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President‟s 2011 budget proposal increases spending for financial market
regulators by 55%.206
Although obscured by our country‟s frustratingly partisan
political environment, President Obama‟s push to regulate markets has
been largely endorsed by public opinion.207 In a 2008 poll, nearly 75% of
Americans believed the financial crisis was caused, in part, by a failure
of government oversight of financial markets.208 As the financial crisis
has affected international markets as well, governmental regulation of
financial markets also has international support.209 Many commentators
echo this desire, indicating that the general thrust of public opinion is in
favor of greater governmental oversight of financial markets.210
The Tambone decision is in direct conflict with this goal. Rather
than expanding (or simply maintaining) the SEC‟s power to investigate
and prosecute fraud, this decision sharply constrains the scope of Rule
10b-5(b). In taking policy considerations into account, the majority
should have held that the need for more regulation of financial markets
trumped the fear of frivolous claims.
206

Elizabeth Williamson, Market Regulators Set to Get Boost, WALL ST. J, February 2,
2010 at A6.
207
See Voters Champion Free Market But Want More Regulation (noting that a
“majority of voters (52%) … believe there is a need for more government regulation of
big business”), available at http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/business/
general_business/december_2008/voters_champion_free_market_but_want_more_regu
lation.
208
See David Pierson, Stricter business controls sought, L.A. TIMES, October 15, 2008
(citing a Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg poll finding that “nearly three-quarters of
respondents thought the lack of regulation was partly responsible for the current
financial and housing crises” and that “stronger regulation of financial markets was …
the top issue for the presidential candidates to address in the remaining weeks of the
campaign.”).
209
See Erosion of Support for Free Market System: Global Poll (citing a GlobeScan
poll of 9,357 respondents in 18 countries that found that in “17 of the 18 countries a
majority (15 countries) or a plurality (two countries) agreed that „the free enterprise
system and the free market system work best in society‟s interest when accompanied by
strong government regulation.‟”), available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/
pdf/apr08/Free_Markets_April08_pr.pdf.
210
David Kusnet, Renewed Deal, N.Y. TIMES, January 18, 2009, (citing economist Jeff
Madrick‟s argument that America “faces social and economic challenges requiring
higher taxes, increased public investment and more rigorous regulation of corporate
conduct.”); see also Floyd Norris, A Retreat From Global Banking, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 2009 (stressing “the need to get the financial system working again, without public
guarantees for everything in sight and with enough safeguards and regulation to avoid a
new crisis.”).
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VI.

CONCLUSION: A GUIDE TO AVOID RULE 10b-5(b)

Although Tambone involved a “tangled web of interlocking
entities,”211 only two entities are necessary to frustrate the intent of Rule
10b-5(b) and stymie an SEC enforcement action: a parent and a
subsidiary. The parent would hire the prospectus drafters and the
subsidiary would hire the underwriters. The drafters would be free to
make any representation necessary to project a solid investment, so long
as the drafters have no actual knowledge of any misstatement in these
representations.
If, for example, the drafters know that investors are generally
wary of litigation, they need only state that there is no such litigation
pending against the parent and believe the veracity of this representation.
The underwriters will be able to use this representation to sell the shares.
The actual truth of the representation is, under the Tambone decision, of
no consequence. Even if the underwriters know that the parent has a
potentially devastating lawsuit on the horizon, they need not fear liability
under Rule 10b-5(b). By simply delivering the prospectus, the
underwriters are not making the representation. The Tambone decision
provides a guide for avoiding what has been one the SEC‟s most useful
tools in enforcing securities laws and dissuading unscrupulous practices.
Regardless of the outcome, Supreme Court review of this
decision is crucial. A reversal of the decision would represent a victory
for investors and a blow to dishonest securities sales techniques. An
affirmation of the decision would also be welcome, as it would hopefully
spur Congress to amend the language of the statute to restore the
Commission with the enforcement powers necessary to protect investors.
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Tambone, 2010 WL 796996 at *12.
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